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Bad Moon Rising: The Sharia Law Bans 
I see the bad moon arising. I see trouble on the way.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Against the backdrop of the ten-year anniversary of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, a heightened interest in the role of Islam in 
American society and the subsequent clash of civilizations 
remains. Specifically, public concern continues to grow across the 
country about the use of Sharia Law, or Islamic Law, within 
American courts.2 As a result, well over a dozen state legislatures 
have introduced or passed legislation that prohibits or limits the 
use of Sharia Law or foreign law in state courts.3 These bills have 
taken two distinct forms: Sharia-specific and facially-neutral bills.  
Regardless of classification, these legislative efforts have 
triggered a number of constitutional concerns, with critics arguing 
that the bills violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
of the First Amendment.4 Critics argue that the laws have a 
sectarian purpose and an effect of advancing one religion at the 
expense of another and thus fail the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudential test.5 Moreover, these critics argue that the laws 
burden the practice of religious faith.6 Indeed, this debate has 
undeniably opened a Pandora’s Box of constitutional concerns.  
Meanwhile, the bills’ proponents vigorously reject the 
accusation that the bills are hostile to Muslims or religious 
freedoms.7 They argue that the bills are designed to proactively 
safeguard the secular constitutional role of government by 
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 1. CREEDENCE CLEARWATER REVIVAL, Bad Moon Rising, on GREEN 
RIVER (Fantasy Records 1969).  
 2. See discussion infra Part I. Sharia Law is the Islamic legal code based 
primarily on the Quran and the Sunna. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III; see also Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of 
Sharia/International Law: Introduced in Mississippi and Kentucky, Advancing in 
Florida & South Dakota, Dying in Virginia, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/02/13/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-
introduced-in-mississippi-and-kentucky-advancing-in-florida-south-dakota-dying-
in-virginia/ (listing legislation in 22 states). 
 4. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 5. See discussion infra Part II, IV. For a bill to pass muster, the law must 
have a legitimate secular purpose, must not have the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion, and must not further an excessive entanglement of 
government and religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–14 (1971).  
 6. See discussion infra Part V.A.  
 7. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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prohibiting religious influence, specifically that of Sharia Law.8 
The proponents, moreover, argue that the bills are aimed at 
reinforcing the supremacy of state and federal law. The central 
argument for combating the rising influence of Sharia Law and 
foreign law is that Americans have a fundamental interest in 
deciding what laws American courts should enforce.9 Furthermore, 
the case law shows that existing law and judicial procedures are 
inadequate in dealing with the growing problem of foreign law, 
particularly Sharia Law, in state courts. 
Because Muslims represent an increasingly large segment of 
the American population, this debate will surely grow in the 
coming years.10 This Comment’s purpose is to provide a survey on 
the Sharia Law bill debate, including the Sharia-specific and 
facially-neutral bills. This Comment seeks to facilitate future 
discussions about this increasingly important topic that lies at the 
dynamic intersection of religious liberty, equal protection, legal 
pluralism, secularism, globalization, and nationalism. Part I 
explores the threshold issue underlying the Sharia Law bill debate: 
Whether Sharia Law can be defined to allow for a categorical 
limitation or prohibition. Part II then explores the growing 
influence that Sharia Law has on the world stage, including its 
spread to Western countries such as Great Britain and the United 
States. Additionally, Part II looks at specific uses of Sharia Law 
within American courts. Part III reviews the specific state 
legislative efforts to prohibit or limit Sharia Law, including the 
neutral legislation. Part IV examines the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment, including their historical interpretation and 
relevant case law. Part V then explores how the Sharia-specific 
bills fare under judicial scrutiny in light of the Religion Clauses’ 
jurisprudential tests. Part V further contends that the Sharia bills 
can survive despite judicial hurdles. Part VI then argues that the 
superior solution to the Sharia problem is the facially-neutral 
foreign law bills, which are sufficiently flexible. This Comment 
argues that the facially-neutral legislation does not violate any 
constitutional guarantees and is necessary in the absence of proper 
judicial procedural safeguards and existing law. Finally, Part VI 
readdresses and reinforces the overall argument of this Comment 
that remedial and preemptive legislative action should be taken to 
address the growing influence of Sharia Law. 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id.  
 9. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 10. See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Number of U.S. Muslims to Double, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 27, 2011, at 1A (discussing a study showing that the U.S. 
population of Muslims is expected to grow substantially in the next 20 years). 
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I. DEFINING SHARIA LAW 
Defining Sharia Law is one of the most vexing and difficult 
challenges posed by the Sharia Law bill debate. Perhaps this is 
why a number of bills that specifically identify Sharia Law make 
no attempt to provide a definition.11 Ultimately, this definitional 
debate over Sharia Law sets the necessary framework for any 
constitutional issues involving state legislative measures. As such, 
any legislative efforts to prohibit or limit the use of Sharia Law in 
state courts have a much better chance of passing constitutional 
muster if the state legislatures are explicit in defining Sharia Law 
rather than leaving it to the courts’ devices. Some preliminary 
questions, therefore, are whether Sharia Law can be clearly defined 
and whether it has a legal character.  
A. Sharia Law: A Brief Overview 
In Arabic, Sharia means “path” and is commonly believed to 
mean the path that Muslims must follow.12 Generally speaking, 
Sharia Law directs a wide array of legal areas such as family law, 
including marriage and divorce, financial dealings, and other areas 
of personal life.13 Sharia Law consists of four sources: the Quran, 
the Sunna, analogical reasoning, and scholarly consensus.14 
The first source of Sharia Law is the Quran, the Islamic holy 
book, which Muslims consider the primary and direct revelation of 
Allah’s will.15 The second source of Sharia Law is the Sunna, 
which provides a detailed account of Mohammad’s life and 
behavior collected from oral reports known as Hadith.16 Because 
the Sunna is indirect and seen as an expression of Mohammad’s 
teachings, it is considered less important than the Quran.17 
However, Muslims regard both the Quran and the Hadith as 
authoritative and immutable.18 Muslims consider the Quran and the 
                                                                                                             
 11. See discussion infra Part III.  
 12. Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and 
Elements, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW: FROM CLASSICAL TO 
CONTEMPORARY 1–3 (Hirsham M. Ramadan ed., 2006).  
 13. Liaquat Ali Khan, Jurodynamics of Islamic Law, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 
231, 274 (2009).  
 14. See Wael B. Hallaq, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 21–22 (2009). 
 15. Abdal-Haqq, supra note 12, at 11.  
 16. Frank Griffel, Introduction, in SHARI’A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 3 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007).  
 17. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, 
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 152 
(2002).  
 18. Khan, supra note 13, at 277.  
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Sunna as the two primary sources, which technically make up the 
Sharia.19 
The last two sources of Sharia Law fall under fiqh, or 
Islamic juristic interpretation.20 As a result of competing juristic 
interpretations, Islamic scholars debate Sharia’s proper 
application.21 The third source is analogical reasoning, which 
developed as a result of ambiguous and equivocal language 
found in the Quran and Hadith.22 To produce specific meanings, 
Islamic jurists developed rules to resolve conflicts, thereby 
establishing a system of legal norms.23 The fourth source of 
Sharia Law is scholarly consensus.24 Like analogical reasoning, 
Islamic scholars use consensus to aid in interpreting the Quran 
and Hadith.25  
Sharia Law developed following Mohammad’s death in 632 
A.D. as the Islamic Empire was expanding.26 Islamic leaders in 
different localities had to reconcile local customs and traditions 
that conflicted with Islam.27 As a result, distinct schools of Islamic 
legal thought developed, including the five major schools of 
thought that survive today.28 These schools of thought mainly 
differ regarding the relative weight each school applies to the four 
sources of Sharia Law.29  
B. The Legal Character of Sharia Law 
Sharia Law has a legal character just like the Civil Law and 
Common Law traditions. At its core, “Islamic law, no different 
from the common law, is a complex mechanism, with a centuries-
long history of evolution and application.”30 Indeed, Professor 
                                                                                                             
 19. Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can 
Teach the International Human Rights Movement, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 67 (2005).  
 20. Id.  
 21. See Maria Reiss, The Materialization of Legal Pluralism in Britain: 
Why Shari’a Council Decisions Should Be Non-Binding, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 739, 743 (2009). 
 22. Hallaq, supra note 14, at 19.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 21.  
 26. Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 17, at 136. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Abdal-Haqq, supra note 12, at 24–25. Four of these schools fall within 
the Sunni tradition and include Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbal; the fifth 
school, Jafari, falls within the Shiite tradition. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Peter W. Beauchamp, Misinterpreted Justice: Problems with the Use of 
Islamic Legal Experts in U.S. Trial Courts, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1097, 1102 
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Scheherazade Rehman explains that Islamic Law can be properly 
understood as a mixture of the Civil Law and Common Law 
traditions.31 Sharia Law is similar to the Civil Law because it is 
based on a code, the Quran; Sharia Law is simultaneously similar 
to the Common Law tradition because Sharia Law is also based on 
the opinions of judges.32 Like Common Law judges, Sharia Law 
judges rely on precedents stemming from both opinion and 
interpretation to decide whether a particular activity is 
permissible.33 The most acute difference between Islamic Law and 
the Civil and Common Laws, however, is that Islamic Law is 
considered to be “divinely inspired and revealed, and therefore not 
given to changes by man, as are the laws in the other two 
traditions.”34 Reflecting this view is Rehman’s statement that 
“[t]he laws in both a Civil Law society and a Common Law society 
are made by human beings, and therefore changeable by them. Not 
so in divinely revealed Shari’ah, the revelation of which has been 
interpreted to some extent, but not changed.”35 Other Islamic legal 
scholars have similarly argued that Sharia Law is unmoving and 
unchanging over time.36  
Some foreign courts have determined that Sharia Law is static 
and definable. In Refah Partisi v. Turkey, for instance, the 
European Court of Human Rights concluded that Sharia, “which 
faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by 
religion, is stable and invariable.”37 The court explained:  
It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and 
human rights while at the same time supporting a regime 
based on sharia [sic], which clearly diverges from 
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal 
law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of 
                                                                                                             
 
(2011). See also Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur’an and the Common Law: 
Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 
544 (1994).  
 31. Scheherazade S. Rehman, Globalization of Islamic Finance Law, 25 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 625, 628 (2008).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. See, e.g., Frederick V. Perry, Shari’ah, Islamic Law and Arab Business 
Ethics, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 357, 368 (2007). Perry contends that “Shari’ah, 
because of its Divine provenance, cannot be changed by man.” Id.  
 37. Refah Partisi v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 
41344/98, § 15, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003-II. 
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women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private 
and public life in accordance with religious precepts.38  
One of the most problematic features of the Sharia legislative 
debate is that no central authority or hierarchy exists for Sharia 
Law as in the Catholic faith, which has a codified Canon Law and 
key leaders.39 Due to the absence of a single authoritative 
interpretation of Sharia Law and doctrine, judges have difficulty 
finding the proper interpretation.40 Even though various schools of 
thought have competing interpretations of Sharia Law, the 
assertion that Sharia lacks a legal character is fundamentally 
flawed and is akin to arguing that American Common Law lacks a 
legal character because it is interpreted somewhat differently in 49 
states. One commentator points out that “despite the differing 
characteristics of Islamic and U.S. legal systems, they are really 
quite similar in function.”41  
C. The Application of Sharia Law 
The clearest manifestation of Sharia Law is ultimately the way 
that it is practiced within a particular legal system.42 Some of the 
most common criticisms of Sharia Law’s application in foreign 
countries are that it oppresses women, denies religious freedom, 
prevents the modernization of finances, imposes severe 
punishment, and creates a hostile environment to non-Muslims.43 
Conservative Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
and Iran, have declared Islam as the official religion and have 
made Sharia the primary source of law.44 Professor Dominic 
McGoldrick summarizes some of the most problematic features of 
Sharia as applied in Islamic countries as follows:  
severe punishments for crimes—death penalty executions 
or limb amputations; stoning or imprisoning women for 
adultery; the criminalisation of sexual activities outside of 
marriage and for homosexual or lesbian activities; non-
recognition of the transgendered; certain rules concerning 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. 
 39. See Sadiq Reza, Torture and Islamic Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 38 
(2007).  
 40. See Charles P. Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for 
Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 632–34 (2006). 
 41. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 1105.  
 42. Id. at 1104.  
 43. Khan, supra note 13, at 233–34.  
 44. See L. Ali Khan, The Qur’an and the Constitution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 161, 
168 (2010).  
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marriage and polygamy, even with more modern legislative 
and administrative limitations and restrictions on it that 
make polygamy difficult; honour killings or attacks; Talaq, 
i.e., unilateral divorce by men, without the consent of the 
wife, even with more modern legislative and administrative 
limitations and restrictions on it; allowing women divorce 
with their husband’s consent but only upon the basis of 
foregoing financial benefits; child custody only for fathers; 
lack of succession rights for women, illegitimate children 
and female children; penalties for apostasy; and the absence 
[of] adoption.45 
The application of these discordant features of Sharia Law is 
wholly inconsistent with U.S. and state constitutional rights and 
state public policy. These discordant features are the true impetus 
for legislative efforts to combat the use or application of Sharia 
Law in state courts.  
II. THE RISE OF SHARIA LAW: A GLOBAL AND AMERICAN REVIEW 
One of the most critical concerns about legislative efforts to 
combat Sharia Law is whether the growing influence of Sharia 
Law in state courts is even a problem that should be addressed. 
Thus, this Part explicates the specific reasons why particular and 
direct steps need to be taken to address the widespread influence of 
Sharia Law across the globe.  
A. The Global Rise of Sharia Law 
Sharia Law’s significance will likely continue to be a rising 
force on the global stage as the Muslim population worldwide is 
expected to significantly increase.46 An example of this global 
rising force is that a growing number of Muslim countries have 
renewed their commitments to Sharia Law, including the 
introduction of a supremacy clause in their national constitutions 
that effectively abrogates laws that conflict with Sharia.47 In 
addition, recent world events indicate that there is global 
                                                                                                             
 45. Dominic McGoldrick, Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From 
Adopting Sharia Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs from Generally Applicable 
Laws, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 603, 621–22 (2009) (citations omitted).  
 46. See Grossman, supra note 10 (noting that the worldwide Muslim 
population is expected to grow by over 30%). 
 47. Khan, supra note 13, at 235. Khan explains that Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Egypt each have included within their constitutions a supremacy clause 
providing that Sharia law trumps any other source. Id.  
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movement toward Sharia Law’s expanded use. In Libya, for 
instance, the overthrow and subsequent killing of Moammar 
Gadhafi has set the stage for Sharia Law’s declaration as the basic 
source of law; if this happens, all laws that conflict with Sharia 
will be nullified.48 
This global wave of Sharia Law has also impacted the legal 
systems of several Western European countries.49 The most 
notable example is the United Kingdom, where Sharia courts have 
become increasingly influential.50 In February 2008, Archbishop of 
Canterbury Rowan Williams started a political firestorm when he 
argued that the rise of Sharia Law “seem[s] unavoidable.”51 
Indeed, the United Kingdom has used Sharia courts since 2008 in 
Muslim civil cases.52 A report by Civitas, an independent British 
think tank, claims that these courts have the potential to hand down 
rulings that are incompatible with British law “because they are 
linked to elements in Islamic law that are seriously out of step with 
trends in Western legislation that derive from the values of the 
Enlightenment and are inherent in modern codes of human 
rights.”53 The study further asserts that “Sharia rulings contain 
great potential for controversy and may involve acts contrary to 
UK legal norms and human rights legislation.”54 
The British Sharia model has consequently served as a rallying 
cry for radical Muslims in Australia to demand a similar separate 
legal framework that recognizes Sharia Law.55 Alas, other Western 
countries have seen a similar increase in the demand for and use of 
                                                                                                             
 48. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Libya Declares Liberation Days After Gaddafi 
Death, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2011, at A10.  
 49. See generally Almas Khan, The Interaction Between Shariah and 
International Law in Arbitration, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 791, 795 (2006). Khan 
explains that Muslims have increasingly settled in secular countries and have 
sought to establish a modified legal framework rather than to complete 
assimilation. Id. See also Mathias Rohe, Shari’a in a European Context, in 
LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 93 (Ralph Grillo et al. eds., 2009) 
(recognizing that “Shari’a has entered European parliaments, administrations, 
and courts”).  
 50. See Civitas: The Institute for the Study of Civil Society, Sharia Courts 
Should Not Be Recognised Under the Arbitration Act, CIVITAS.ORG.UK (June 29, 
2009), http://www.civitas.org.uk/press/prcs91.php. 
 51. See Mark L. Movsesian, Fiqh and Canons: Reflections on Islamic and 
Christian Jurisprudence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 881 (2010).  
 52. Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, SUNDAY 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ctwilcox.com/articles/uksharia 
courts.pdf.  
 53. Civitas, supra note 50.  
 54. Id.  
 55. See Chris Merritt, Local Islamists Draw on British Success in Bid for 
Sharia Law, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 7, 2011, at 29. 
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Sharia Law in their countries. A recent report by the French 
intellectual think tank L’Institut Montaigne warns that Sharia Law 
is rapidly displacing French Civil Law in many parts of suburban 
Paris.56 Additionally, the Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) issued 
a report indicating that Sharia Law is also a growing issue in 
Germany, The Netherlands, France, and Spain.57 
B. The Growing Influence of Sharia Law in the United States 
The global Sharia wave has reached the shores of the United 
States. In 2011, an adjunct professor of law at Rutgers Law School 
and Pace Law School created a website that actively promotes the 
use of Sharia Law in American courts.58 Furthermore, Islamic Law 
has undoubtedly had an increased role in American courts.59 A 
recent study by the Center for Security Policy found that Sharia 
Law has been applied or recognized in 23 states across the 
country.60 This comprehensive study identified 150 cases involving 
Sharia Law’s use in state courts.61 Twenty-nine of these cases were 
designated as “highly relevant,” meaning that the use or 
consideration of Sharia Law conflicted with constitutional 
protections or state public policy at either the trial court or 
appellate court level.62 In addition, the study identified 21 cases 
                                                                                                             
 56. See Soeren Kern, French Suburbs Becoming ‘Separate Islamic Societies’, 
GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Oct. 10, 2011, 4:45 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute. 
org/2487/french-suburbs-islamic-societies (discussing the report). 
 57. IRFAN AL-ALAWI, STEPHEN SULEYMAN SCHWARTZ, KAMAL HASANI, 
VELI SIRIN, DAUT DAUTI & QANTA AHMED, CTR. FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM, A 
GUIDE TO SHARIAH LAW AND ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY IN WESTERN EUROPE 2007–
2009 (2009), available at http://www.islamicpluralism.org/documents/shariah-
law-islamist-ideology-western-europe.pdf. See also Rohe, supra note 49, at 93. 
 58. See SHARIA IN AMERICA, http://shariainamerica.com (last visited Feb. 23, 
2012). 
 59. See, e.g., Karson v. Soleimani, Nos. B216360, B219698, 2010 WL 
2992071 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2010) (Appellate court reversed the trial court’s 
finding that Iran was a more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens because Iran lacked due process protections.); see also Tarikonda v. 
Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (Appellate 
court reversed a decision that enforced a unilateral divorce decree from India 
under the judicial doctrine of comity.). 
 60. CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY, SHARIAH LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES (2011), available at http: 
//shariahinamericancourts.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Sharia_Law_And_ 
American_State_Courts_1.4_06212011.pdf.  
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
610 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
that were deemed “relevant,” meaning that Sharia Law was a 
significant factor in a judicial decision.63  
Many of the cases analyzed in the Center for Security Policy 
study show that state court judges have allowed Sharia and foreign 
law sources to trump constitutionally protected rights, most 
notably in child custody and divorce cases.64 In Hosain v. Malik, 
for instance, a Maryland appellate court affirmed a decision that 
directly conflicted with the interests of a mother and her child.65 
The mother, along with her daughter, fled Pakistan to the United 
States after the mother was accused of adultery and subject to 
death by stoning.66 In response, the father, a Pakistani citizen, 
obtained a Pakistani custody order at a hearing in which the mother 
did not attend out of fear of arrest and a possible death sentence.67 
Several years later, the mother filed for custody in Maryland, but 
the state court denied her custody after applying relevant Pakistani 
customs, cultures, and mores, rather than a decision “based on 
Maryland law, i.e., American cultures and mores.”68 The appellate 
court noted that the well-being and interests of the family were “to 
be facilitated by adherence to Islamic teachings, [and] one would 
expect that a Pakistani court would weigh heavily the removal of 
the child from that influence as detrimental.”69 The court further 
explained: “It certainly is not our task on this appeal to attempt to 
reorder the priorities of the Pakistani court . . . .”70 After that 
decision, one commentator argued that “[b]ecause such rules do 
not remotely parallel the best interests criteria of Maryland, the 
Court of Special Appeals failed in its duty as parens patriae [sic] to 
protect the Malik child.”71  
                                                                                                             
 63. Id.  
 64. See In re Marriage of Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(Appellate court enforced a Lebanese custody order giving custody to the 
husband even though the trial court found that the Islamic court denied due 
process and did not base its ruling on the best interests of the child.); see also In 
re Makhlouf, 695 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (Appellate court enforced a 
Jordanian Sharia court decision that granted custody to the father because the 
mother had remarried.).  
 65. 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).  
 66. Id. at 1006.  
 67. Id. at 1021.  
 68. Id. at 1000.  
 69. Id. at 1001. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Monica E. Henderson, U.S. State Court Review of Islamic Law Custody 
Decrees—When Are Islamic Custody Decrees in the Child’s Best Interest?, 36 
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 423, 443 (1998). Henderson advises that “state courts should 
be circumspect of foreign custody decrees based on Islamic law.” Id. at 424.  
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Although courts should categorically reject claims based on 
Islamic Law when it conflicts with public policy, the Center for 
Security Policy report and relevant jurisprudence show that this is 
certainly not always the case.72 The precise number of cases 
involving Sharia Law or other foreign legal doctrines is very 
difficult to determine because most trial court judgments are not 
widely available.73 One commentator contends that “even if the 
majority of demands for sharia [sic] are denied, women and 
children should not be forced to play legal Russian roulette.”74  
Furthermore, the use of Sharia Law in American courts has not 
been confined to family law matters, as evidenced in Saudi Basic 
Industry Corporation v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company.75 
In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the trial 
court properly analyzed a tort counterclaim based on Sharia and 
Saudi Arabian law.76 The court noted that the “trial judge went to 
extraordinary lengths to understand the applicable Saudi law and to 
make rulings that were consistent with the numerous Saudi law 
sources presented to her.”77 The court then described how the trial 
court properly applied Sharia legal analysis.78 Consequently, both 
the trial court and appellate decisions “are perhaps the clearest 
examples of how U.S. courts’ misguided reliance on Islamic legal 
experts to adjudicate issues involving Islamic law is creating bad 
law.”79  
Additional non-family law cases exist in which courts have 
become entangled in Islamic Law.80 For example, in National 
Group for Communications & Computers Limited v. Lucent 
Technologies International Inc., a U.S. district court looked to both 
Saudi Arabian legal principles and Islamic Law in evaluating a 
telecommunications contract.81 The court specifically cited several 
of the Prophet Mohammad’s statements to support its decision.82 
The growing problem of courts getting involved in matters 
                                                                                                             
 72. See CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY, supra note 60.  
 73. See Stephen Gelé, Southern Poverty Law Center on Sharia in U.S. 
Courts: Move On, Nothing to See Here, BREITBART (Jun. 20, 2011), http:// 
www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2011/06/20/Southern-Poverty-Law-Center-on 
-Shariah-in-American-Courts--Move-On--Nothing-To-See-Here.  
 74. Id.  
 75. 866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005). 
 76. See id.  
 77. Id. at 30. In this case, the issue involved circumstances under which 
ghasb (usurpation) applied.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 1113.  
 80. See Trumbull, supra note 40, at 633–34.  
 81. 331 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2004). 
 82. See id.  
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regarding Sharia Law has led to “court decisions that put U.S. 
judges and juries in roles that they are ill-equipped to fulfill, and 
which are inaccurate portrayals of how Islamic law functions.”83 
The debate over the Sharia bills in the United States reached a 
fever pitch when a New Jersey judge refused to issue a restraining 
order against a Muslim husband who physically abused his 
pregnant wife and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse over 
several weeks.84 The judge held that the husband did not have the 
necessary criminal intent to rape his wife because he believed that 
his Islamic faith permitted him to have sex with her whenever he 
desired.85 The judge relied on testimony from the husband’s imam, 
an Islamic religious leader, that a wife must comply with her 
husband’s sexual demands.86 The court record graphically 
illustrated the severe bruises that the wife experienced from the 
systematic beatings and forced sex.87 In 2010, a state appeals court 
overturned this decision and explained that the case “presents a 
conflict between the criminal law and religious precepts.”88 The 
appellate court reasoned: “In resolving this conflict, the judge 
determined to except defendant from the operation of the State’s 
statutes as the result of his religious beliefs. In doing so, the judge 
was mistaken.”89 The movement to ban Sharia Law from 
consideration in state courts spread rapidly as a result of this 
case.90  
III. THE STATE LEGISLATIVE BILLS AGAINST SHARIA LAW AND 
FOREIGN LAW  
The legislation designed to combat the rising influence of 
Sharia and foreign law in American courts can be broken down 
into two distinct categories: Sharia-specific bills and facially 
neutral foreign-law bills. This Part explains and deconstructs these 
legislative efforts.  
                                                                                                             
 83. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 1119.  
 84. See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 85. Id. at 428. 
 86. Id. at 426–27.  
 87. See id. at 421–24. The wife vividly described how her husband forced 
her to undress, pinched her private areas, pulled her pubic hair, and caused her 
vagina to become severely swollen. 
 88. Id. at 432–33.  
 89. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
 90. See Maxim Lott, Advocates of Anti-Shariah Measures Alarmed by 
Judge’s Ruling, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/ 
2010/08/05/advocates-anti-shariah-measures-alarmed-judges-ruling.  
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A. Sharia-Specific Bills 
A number of states have either considered or enacted laws that 
specifically mention Sharia Law. In 2010, the Arizona House of 
Representatives considered House Bill 2379, known as the Arizona 
Foreign Decisions Act, which provided that state courts could not 
use, implement, or refer to any body of religious sectarian law in 
any decision, finding or opinion.91 The bill defined religious 
sectarian law to include “Sharia law, Canon law, Halacha and 
Karma.”92 In 2011, the Iowa Legislature considered a bill designed 
to ensure that “courts [do not] consider international law or Sharia 
law.”93 Several other states have also proposed similar bills that 
specifically identify Sharia Law.94  
The most decisive battles over Sharia-specific legislation have 
taken place in Oklahoma. On November 2, 2010, State Question 
755 (SQ 755), which aimed to amend the Oklahoma Constitution, 
passed with more than 70% of the vote.95 SQ 755 “forbids state 
courts from considering international law or Sharia law when 
deciding cases.”96 Shortly after its passage, Muneer Awad, 
executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on 
American–Islamic Relations, filed suit in a federal district court in 
Oklahoma to prevent the State Election Board from certifying the 
election results.97 On November 29, 2010, the district court held 
that SQ 755 violated the United States Constitution’s Religion 
Clauses and issued a preliminary injunction.98 Furthermore, the 
district court found that Sharia Law is not actually law because it 
lacks a legal character. Instead, the court viewed Sharia Law as a 
set of religious traditions that differ among Muslims and that 
merely give guidance to Muslims.99 The district court reasoned that 
any state effort to prohibit Sharia Law’s use or consideration 
would require courts to determine its content; this in turn would 
                                                                                                             
 91. H.R. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).  
 92. Id. 
 93. H.R.J. Res. 14, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011).  
 94. See, e.g., H.R. 597, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); S. 62, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 
2011); H.R.J. Res. 31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); S.J. Res. 
18, 50th Leg. Sess., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2011); H.R.J. Res. 8, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Wyo. 2011); H.R. 301, 126th Leg. (Miss. 2011). 
 95. Barbara Hoberock, Suit Filed over Shariah Law Question, TULSA 
WORLD (Nov. 4, 2010, 8:16 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article. 
aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=20101104_11_0_OKLAHO957185. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2010). 
 99. Id. at 1306. 
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cause unnecessary intrusion into an adherent’s religious beliefs and 
doctrines.100 The Tenth Circuit later affirmed this decision.101 
B. Facially-Neutral Bills: The American Laws for American 
Courts (ALAC) Act  
Several states have considered or introduced bills that do not 
specifically mention Sharia Law but instead seek to prevent or 
limit the use of foreign law in state courts.102 The American Public 
Policy Alliance (APPA), a nonpartisan advocacy organization, has 
spearheaded the effort to combat the use of foreign law in 
American courts by drafting model legislation called the American 
Laws for American Courts (ALAC).103 In a nutshell, ALAC is 
designed to prevent judicial enforcement of foreign law when the 
enforcement violates constitutional protections and public 
policy.104 ALAC defines foreign law as “any law, legal code, or 
system of a jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the 
United States, including, but not limited to, international 
organizations and tribunals, and applied by that jurisdiction’s 
courts, administrative bodies, or other formal or informal 
tribunals.”105 The APPA notes that the bills do not just address 
Sharia and foreign sources of law, but they also target 
transnationalism, which the APPA defines as “the documented 
creep of foreign and anti-public policy laws being recognized by 
state and federal courts.”106 
In 2010, the Louisiana legislature passed Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 9:6001, which is essentially a carbon copy of 
ALAC.107 A similar bill was passed that same year in Tennessee.108 
In 2011, Arizona passed House Bill 2064, which is based in part on 
ALAC but is less comprehensive than the bills passed in Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id.  
 101. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 102. See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 103. Am. Pub. Policy Alliance, Legislation > American Laws for American 
Courts Model Act, http://publicpolicyalliance.org/legislation/model-alac-bill/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 104. See id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Am. Pub. Policy Alliance, Legislation > American Laws for American 
Courts Frequently Asked Questions, Issues and Objections, http://public 
policyalliance.org/legislation/alac-faq/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 107. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010).  
 108. H.R. 3768, Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2010) (signed into law as TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 20-15-101 to -106 (Westlaw 2012)).  
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and Tennessee.109 The trajectory of recent state legislative actions 
shows the high likelihood that the ALAC bills are becoming 
increasingly popular in state legislatures.110 Although several 
ALAC bills have passed, they have not yet been challenged in the 
courts. 
A number of states have introduced or considered variations of 
ALAC. In 2010, the Utah House considered House Bill 296, which 
sought to prohibit any arbitrator, administrative agency, or other 
adjudicative, mediation, or enforcement authority from enforcing a 
“decision rendered by any legislative, judicial, or other 
governmental authority of a foreign nation or power if the . . . 
decision rendered violated or would violate a right.”111 In 2011, the 
Alaskan House considered House Bill 88, which sought to prohibit 
“a court, arbitrator, mediator, administrative agency, or 
enforcement authority from applying a law, rule, or provision of an 
agreement that violates an individual's right under the Constitution 
of the State of Alaska or the United States Constitution.”112 A 
nearly identical bill was considered in Arkansas.113 
IV. THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE SHARIA BILLS: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
To properly understand the Sharia Law debate, exploring the 
Religion Clauses’ current understandings and scope is crucial. The 
First Amendment to the Constitution provides that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.”114 The Sharia Law bill debate has 
generated concerns that the bills violate First Amendment 
guarantees regarding the establishment of religion and the free 
exercise of religion.  
A. Establishment Clause Overview 
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause has been seen as 
a safeguard to ensure that the government is neutral toward 
                                                                                                             
 109. H.R. 2064, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). Unlike the bills 
passed in Louisiana and Tennessee, the Arizona bill goes into much less detail 
regarding specific enforcement and application. 
 110. Jill Schachner Chanen, The Law of the Land, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2011, at 
14, 14. See also H.R. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); S. 1294, 113th 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.R. 45, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).  
 111. H.R. 296, 95th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).  
 112. H.R. 88, 27th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2011). 
 113. See S. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb. (Ark. 2011).  
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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religion by not favoring one particular religion or favoring religion 
over nonreligion.115 The Supreme Court has stressed that “[t]he 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”116 In 
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, the Court 
upheld a New Jersey law that funded student transportation to both 
parochial and secular schools.117 Justice Hugo Black, writing for 
the majority, stated, “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of 
separation between church and State.’”118 
In 1971, the Court established a three-part test for 
Establishment Clause challenges in Lemon v. Kurtzman.119 First, 
the statute under scrutiny must have a secular or legislative 
purpose.120 Second, the law’s principal effect must neither advance 
nor inhibit religion.121 Third, the law must not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.122 Any government action 
must pass all three prongs of the Lemon test to be consistent with 
the Establishment Clause.123  
The Court has stressed caution when walking the fine line 
between religious and secular issues. In Hernandez v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for example, the Court 
underscored the danger of forcing courts to differentiate between 
religious and secular issues.124 The Court warned that judicial 
involvement in the religious–secular divide raises a “central danger 
against [what] we have held the Establishment Clause guards.”125 
Furthermore, in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church and its 
                                                                                                             
 115. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844, 859 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he touchstone for our [Establishment 
Clause] analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion’”(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))).  
 116. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).  
 117. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 118. Id. at 16.  
 119. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In this case, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania 
educational act that allowed the state superintendent to reimburse nonpublic 
schools, including religious schools, for the teachers’ salaries and materials. 
 120. Id. at 612. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 613.  
 123. Id. at 612–13.  
 124. 490 U.S. 680 (1989). See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728–31 
(1871) (holding that secular courts cannot decide issues of religious law).  
 125. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 694 (noting that such inquiries into the secular–
religious issues could possibly constitute “pervasive monitoring”).  
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progeny, the Court has regularly held that deciding disputes over 
religious doctrine violates the Establishment Clause.126 
Despite the jurisprudential popularity of the Lemon test, the 
Court has not always employed the test when evaluating 
Establishment Clause challenges but sometimes uses an 
endorsement test or a coercion test.127 The endorsement test 
requires examination of whether a reasonable and informed 
observer would view governmental action or practices as endorsing 
religion.128 The coercion test requires courts to evaluate whether 
the government has coerced “anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise.”129  
Ultimately, there is still a great deal of confusion and 
frustration regarding the proper judicial handling of Establishment 
Clause challenges, with Justice Thomas noting that the 
“jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray.”130 Similarly, Justice Scalia 
has argued that the Lemon test has led to “seemingly simple 
mandates [that] have been manipulated to fit whatever result the 
Court aimed to achieve.”131 
B. Free Exercise Clause Overview 
Courts remained relatively silent regarding the Free Exercise 
Clause in early American constitutional history. The first time the 
Court closely examined the clause’s nature and scope involved the 
prosecution of a Mormon polygamist in the 1868 case of Reynolds v. 
United States.132 In Reynolds, the Court affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction by flatly rejecting his assertion that he was exempted 
from the anti-polygamy statute based on his religious beliefs. The 
Court explained: “Laws are made for the government of actions, and 
                                                                                                             
 126. 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that courts do not have jurisdiction to 
determine a matter of church doctrine). See also Gelé, infra note 179 and 
accompanying text.  
 127. See B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial 
Deism and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 728 (2010). Hill 
argues that it is a guessing game to determine which test will apply.  
 128. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 575–76 (1989) (noting 
that the endorsement test can be used to evaluate claims under the Establishment 
Clause in conjunction with the purpose prong of the Lemon test).  
 129. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (holding prayer at 
a secondary school graduation ceremony unconstitutional after using the 
coercion test).  
 130. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 131. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 132. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
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while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, 
they may with practices.”133 The Court warned that any effort to 
allow exemptions from the law based on religious beliefs would 
make these beliefs impermissibly superior to the law of the land.134  
The Court later rejected government censorship of religion in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut.135 In Cantwell, the Court reversed the 
conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness charged with soliciting 
donations without proper local approval.136 The Court determined 
that any law granting a public body the function of determining 
whether a cause is “religious” violates the Free Exercise Clause.137 
The Court underscored, however, that “[c]onduct remains subject 
to regulation for the protection of society.”138 
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence underwent a marked 
change in the 1960s, when the Warren Court took a more 
expansive view of religious protections in Sherbert v. Verner.139 In 
Sherbert, the Court reversed a denial of unemployment benefits to 
a Seventh Day Adventist based on her unwillingness to work on 
Saturdays, which was against her religious beliefs.140 The Court 
explained that the government’s action substantially burdened the 
appellant’s free exercise of religion because the availability of 
benefits hinged upon her unwillingness to violate her central 
religious beliefs, thus effectively creating an impermissible 
penalty.141 In reversing, the Court established a strict scrutiny 
standard in Free Exercise Clause analysis requiring the state to 
show a compelling government interest if the government’s action 
substantially burdened the free exercise of religion.142  
Decades later, the Court moved in a new jurisprudential 
direction and limited the Warren Court’s expansive protections of 
the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith.143 In 
Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require 
Oregon to exempt the sacramental ingestion of peyote by members 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).  
 134. Id. See also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). In 
Cleveland, the Court again rejected the religious beliefs defense by affirming the 
conviction of polygamists under the Mann Act.  
 135. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  
 136. Id. at 311. 
 137. Id. at 305. 
 138. Id. at 304. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 
(1944) (stressing that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community [to danger]”). 
 139. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 140. See id.  
 141. Id. at 412–13. 
 142. Id. at 403.  
 143. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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of the Native American Church from Oregon’s criminal drug 
laws.144 The Court explained the new limitations by stating, “The 
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment 
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously 
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, 
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections.”145 One commentator contends that 
Smith is designed “to make sure the rule of law is not upended in 
the name of religious freedom.”146 
Three years after Smith, the Court revisited the Free Exercise 
Clause in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah.147 In Church of Lukumi, the Court struck down an 
ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the 
Santeria religion.148 Eleven years later, in Locke v. Davey, the 
Court considered a Free Exercise challenge against a state-funded 
scholarship program that could not be used to pursue a degree in 
religion.149 The Court rejected the argument that the program was 
presumptively unconstitutional and that it disfavored religion.150 
The Court explained: 
In the present case, the State’s disfavor of religion (if it can 
be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither 
criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service 
or rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate 
in the political affairs of the community. And it does not 
require students to choose between their religious beliefs 
and receiving a government benefit.151 
The Court stressed that the law merely reflected the state’s 
decision not to fund a specific area of study.152 
V. AN APPLICATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE TESTS TO THE SHARIA BILLS 
Under current jurisprudence, Sharia-specific legislation can 
pass constitutional muster for five reasons. First, Sharia Law has a 
                                                                                                             
 144. Id. at 890. 
 145. Id. at 881.  
 146. Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1831, 1855 (2011).  
 147. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  
 148. Id. at 547. 
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legal character severable from the Islamic faith.153 In other words, 
the bills are targeting a legal code, not a religion. Second, the 
Sharia bills are consistent with the historical and current 
understanding of the Establishment Clause because the bills 
prevent judges from becoming excessively entangled with religion. 
Third, the Court has repeatedly held that legislative efforts will 
withstand challenges even if the efforts have an incidental impact 
on religion.154 Fourth, the specific reference to Sharia is necessary 
to guarantee that no party or court will conclude that the legislation 
does not apply to Sharia Law. Fifth, the compelling interests to 
support efforts against the rising significance of Sharia Law are 
legion and substantial. These reasons are developed more fully 
below.  
A. Sharia-Specific Legislation and the Establishment Clause 
The Sharia-specific bills are consistent with Establishment 
Clause case law and thus can pass constitutional muster in that 
regard. The first step of the Lemon test requires courts to determine 
whether the statute has a legislative or secular purpose.155 Sharia-
specific bills can pass Lemon’s first prong for a number of reasons. 
First, the Court has stressed that the primary purpose of the 
challenged law must be secular even if arguably more than one 
purpose drives the legislation.156 Because the primary purpose of 
the Sharia legislation is to reinforce the supremacy of federal and 
state laws, the Sharia bills pass the first prong.157 One commentator 
contends that amendments that reference Sharia, specifically 
Oklahoma’s SQ 755, “can survive the first prong of the Lemon test 
by arguing that the amendment was intended to define Oklahoma’s 
legal system and had nothing to do with promoting another 
                                                                                                             
 153. See discussion supra Parts I, III.  
 154. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 155. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  
 156. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844, 845 (2005) (noting that a statute or government action will be deemed 
unconstitutional when the action serves the predominant purpose of advancing 
religion); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (noting that the 
purpose prong can be satisfied as long as the challenged law was not “motivated 
wholly by religious considerations”).  
 157. See, e.g., supra notes 91–99 and accompanying text. SQ 755’s stated 
purpose is to prevent Oklahoma courts from “look[ing] to the legal precepts of 
other nations or cultures.” Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. 
Okla. Nov. 29, 2010). 
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religious faith or singling out Islam.”158 Second, Lemon grants 
deference to the government’s stated purpose.159 The purpose of 
the Sharia legislation is to reaffirm “the Constitution’s Article VI 
Supremacy Clause and the laws that govern the state’s legal 
system, a constitutional use of State sovereignty.”160 Third, the 
Court is ordinarily reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to 
state laws.161  
In addition, the Sharia bills can pass the Lemon test’s second 
prong, requiring that a law’s principal effect neither advance nor 
inhibit religion. Sharia-specific bills survive this prong because the 
laws do not seek to advance or inhibit religion but instead are 
designed simply to prevent judges from looking to Sharia Law.162 
The Court has noted that even if a law happens to coincide or 
harmonize with tenets of some or all religions, the law will not 
necessarily fail this prong.163 Finally, the Sharia bills pass the 
Lemon test’s third prong because the overriding purpose of the 
bills is to prevent the courts from becoming excessively entangled 
in religious matters.164 
While one can certainly make the case that Sharia-specific laws 
survive the Lemon test, a number of valid counterarguments 
challenge the constitutionality of such legislation. By specifically 
referencing Sharia Law in the text, the secular legislative purpose 
becomes seemingly questionable. This concern similarly applies to 
the second prong of the test regarding whether the law has the 
principal or primary effect of advancing or prohibiting religion. By 
specifically referencing Sharia Law, the bills run the risk of 
appearing to put Sharia at a disadvantage compared to Jewish or 
Christian law. The most significant problem, however, is that the 
absence of an adequate definition of Sharia may force the courts to 
become excessively entangled with religion. In other words, 
because judges are not equipped to determine what constitutes 
Sharia in accordance with the legislation, the bills will possibly fail 
the third prong. In Awad, for instance, the court noted that 
“Oklahoma courts will be faced with determining the content of 
                                                                                                             
 158. Jordan Sekulow, In Defense of Oklahoma’s Sharia Ban, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 23, 2010, 12:28 PM), http://onfaith.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/panelists/ 
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 159. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74–75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
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Sharia law, and, thus, the content of plaintiff’s religious 
doctrines.”165 
Despite the Sharia-specific bills facing a number of substantial 
hurdles from the outset, the very use of Sharia Law in the courts 
presents an even more egregious Establishment Clause violation. 
Because courts will be required to make determinations of 
religious doctrine in the absence of a Sharia bill, they will be even 
more likely to enter an Establishment Clause quagmire.166 As a 
result, a classic Catch-22 scenario has developed over the Sharia 
bill debate. On one hand, the Sharia-specific bills that 
insufficiently define Sharia may force courts to wade into murky 
Establishment Clause territory. On the other hand, the very use of 
Sharia Law in courts will unquestionably require judges to enter a 
similar judicial minefield without any legislative guidance.167 A 
notable example of the latter concern was seen in National Group 
for Communications where the judge applied both Saudi Arabian 
law and Islamic Law to resolve a contract dispute.168 One scholar 
argues that this case demonstrates how the courts often violate the 
First Amendment by getting involved in disputes involving Sharia 
or foreign law.169 The scholar notes: “In applying Saudi law (and 
thus Islamic law) to determine the parties’ rights under the 
contract, the judge had to . . . make an independent determination 
of religious doctrine.”170 Cases like National Group for 
Communications demonstrate a pressing need to specifically 
address Sharia Law’s growing influence in a particularized manner 
because no historical precedent adequately instructs judges how 
best to deal with Sharia Law in domestic courts. Indeed, the use of 
Sharia Law is unlike adjudication involving Christian or Jewish 
disputes, where the courts have generally avoided religious 
entanglement by deferring interpretive concerns to the hierarchical 
authorities of the church or synagogue or by referring to 
corresponding authoritative interpretations.171  
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The bills that specifically identify Sharia Law prevent judges 
from entering this debate because the Sharia Law bills effectively 
prevent judges from identifying and interpreting Quranic 
understanding and Mohammad’s teachings from the start.172 
Common sense and case law suggest that the Sharia bills provide a 
proactive and preemptive measure that prevents the risk of 
excessive entanglement. As a result, the bills that mention Sharia 
are constitutional, based on the historical understanding of the 
Establishment Clause and case law, but the weighty constitutional 
hurdles suggest that alternative approaches should be considered. 
In addition, the bills specifically identifying Sharia Law can be 
strengthened in a number of ways, such as more adequately 
defining Sharia Law in order to prevent judges from doing so. 
B. Sharia-Specific Bills and the Free Exercise Clause  
The threshold question in Free Exercise Clause analysis is 
whether bills specifically identifying Sharia Law place a 
substantial burden on Muslims’ religious beliefs.173 The answer is 
highly debatable because the legislation limits or prohibits 
consideration of Sharia Law only in the courtroom. Some courts, 
however, have found that the legislation would likely burden 
religious freedom. In Awad, for example, the court determined that 
SQ 755 would likely violate the plaintiff’s right to free exercise of 
religion because the amendment prevented Oklahoma courts from 
probating his Sharia-compliant will.174 This analysis is 
extraordinarily flawed, however, because any court involvement in 
Awad’s religious beliefs, including the consideration of his will, if 
only understood by Sharia Law’s application, would cause 
unnecessary entanglement, thus violating the Establishment 
Clause.175 Furthermore, the Court has stressed that laws can 
survive Free Exercise analysis even if they incidentally burden a 
particular religious practice or belief.176 In Locke, the Court 
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highlighted that a state law can pass constitutional muster even if 
the action causes an arguable burden on religious free exercise as 
long as the state’s interest is substantial.177 As such, the bills can 
pass constitutional muster because the states have a substantial 
interest and the impact on religious free exercise is (at worst) 
minimal and incidental. 
Another free exercise challenge that these bills may face is that 
they are not specific enough. Due to the failure to isolate Sharia 
Law’s specific discordant features, courts may find that the bills 
are categorically overbroad. Perhaps the bills can be strengthened 
by directly pinpointing the problematic aspects unique to Sharia 
Law, such as unilateral divorce without the wife’s consent; child 
custody only for fathers; and the lack of succession rights for 
women, illegitimate children, and female children.178 
Another important free exercise concern is the criticism that 
singling out Sharia Law, while not mentioning other 
denominations, runs the risk of creating a seeming preference for 
the Judeo–Christian religions instead of the neutral protection of 
religious free exercise. However, Free Exercise jurisprudence 
suggests that legislative measures targeting conduct may be 
permissible even if they conflict with certain religious principles or 
beliefs.179 In Reynolds, for example, the Court upheld the 
conviction of a Mormon on polygamy charges even though 
polygamy was an accepted practice within the Mormon faith.180 
The Court stressed that the anti-polygamy law was not an anti-
Mormon measure but was instead aimed at specific conduct that 
conflicted with public policy.181 The Court has repeatedly followed 
this jurisprudential direction established in Reynolds by holding 
that religious freedom does not include the right to violate criminal 
laws, including polygamy (Cleveland) and smoking peyote 
(Smith), even when religious doctrine permits or mandates the 
prohibited practice.182 
VI. THE WAY FORWARD: THE ALAC BILLS 
Because of the serious constitutional concerns regarding the 
Sharia-specific bills, state legislatures that are worried about 
                                                                                                             
 177. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004). 
 178. See discussion supra Part I.C.  
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 181. Id.  
 182. See discussion supra Part IV.B; see also Gelé, supra note 179.  
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growth of foreign law, including Sharia Law, in state courts should 
pursue the facially-neutral ALAC legislation. The model ALAC 
legislation and bills based on the model are designed to prevent 
judicial enforcement of foreign law only when the enforcement 
violates constitutional protections and public policy.183 One 
commentator explains:  
Because of the careful planning and thought behind 
ALAC’s wording, in contrast to SQ 755, from a practical 
standpoint, it is effective in preventing the enforcement of 
any foreign law—including in many cases, shariah law 
[sic]—that would violate U.S. and state constitutional 
liberties or state public policy.184 
The ALAC bills are superior to the Sharia-specific bills 
because they purge the religious concerns from the constitutional 
calculus by removing any perception of denominational 
preferences. Moreover, the ALAC model is designed to focus on 
the root of the problem because the primary threat stems from the 
use of foreign countries’ legal frameworks and cultural 
modalities.185 For instance, in State v. Kargar, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine vacated an Afghan immigrant’s conviction 
for two counts of gross sexual assault because his actions were 
consistent with customary practices in Afghanistan.186 Specifically, 
this case involved the defendant licking an infant’s penis, yet the 
court inexplicably determined that there was no evidence of actual 
harm to the infant.187 ALAC would prevent such miscarriages of 
justice.  
ALAC forbids judges from looking to foreign legal sources 
that conflict with American constitutional protections.188 The 
version passed in Louisiana, for instance, requires that judges not 
look to the following:  
the application of a foreign law [that] will result in the 
violation of a right guaranteed by the constitution of this 
state or of the United States, including but not limited to 
                                                                                                             
 183. See Am. Pub. Policy Alliance, supra note 103. 
 184. Christopher Holton, American Laws for American Courts, AM. THINKER 
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due process, freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any 
right of privacy or marriage as specifically defined by the 
constitution of this state.189  
Given the arguable indeterminacy of Islamic Law, the ALAC bills 
provide a meaningful and constitutionally permissible solution.  
A. The ALAC Bills and the Establishment Clause  
The ALAC bills stand a much better chance of surviving the 
Lemon test because the bills are facially-neutral and therefore 
affect all religions equally. The Court has recognized that even if a 
law happens to coincide or harmonize with tenets of some or all 
religions, the bill will not necessarily fail the Lemon test.190 
Admittedly, the most difficult challenge that the foreign-law bills 
will face is the allegation that the bills were made for a 
discriminatory purpose directed against Islam.191 However, the 
ALAC bills can survive this challenge by highlighting that the 
measures are not directed at Islam but are directed at the use and 
application of discordant Sharia Law tied to foreign countries that 
has crept into American courtrooms. ALAC advocates claim that 
the bills’ “sole objective is to protect all U.S. citizens and residents 
from the application of foreign laws when the application of a 
foreign law will result in the violation, in the specific matter at 
issue, of a liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States or the public policies of the state in question.”192 A further 
indication that the neutral purpose argument will succeed is the 
fact that only four times has the Court ever struck down a state 
action on the grounds that the action had an illegitimate religious 
motive.193 
                                                                                                             
 189. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010). 
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The current ALAC model is particularly designed to reinforce 
Establishment Clause protections. The ALAC model bill specifically 
provides that “[n]o court shall interpret this Act to require or 
authorize any court to adjudicate, or prohibit any religious 
organization from adjudicating, ecclesiastical matters . . . where 
adjudication by a court would violate the prohibition of the 
establishment clause . . . or violate the Constitution of this State.”194 
Indeed, in 2011, the American Islamic Leadership Coalition (AILC) 
supported the proposed Michigan ALAC bill195 and stated that the 
ALAC strengthens the “First Amendment’s Establishment Clause 
and the separation between religion and state.”196 
B. The ALAC Bills and the Free Exercise Clause 
Because the ALAC bills are facially-neutral, generally 
applicable, and do not discriminate against or target religious 
practice, the bills have a much better chance of surviving Free 
Exercise challenges.197 In Church of Lukumi, the Court stressed 
that the legislature should receive deference on the question 
involving facial neutrality and that most laws satisfy the test.198 In 
its support of the proposed Michigan ALAC bill, the AILC argues: 
“We see no evidence that statutes like HB 4769 will adversely 
impact the free exercise of our personal pietistic observance of 
Islam, which is not in conflict with the U.S. or Michigan 
constitutions.”199 
Furthermore, the ALAC bills provide sufficient protection to 
safeguard against Free Exercise violations. The ALAC bills 
specifically provide that “[n]o court or arbitrator shall interpret this 
Act to limit the right of any person to the free exercise of religion 
as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
by the Constitution of this State.”200 One commentator argues that 
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ALAC is a superior option because “it specifically says that the 
law cannot detract from the right to free exercise of religion, which 
would include religious courts like Jewish Bet Din or Catholic 
ecclesiastical courts.”201 
Like the potential Establishment Clause challenges, the most 
serious challenge to ALAC is the argument that the bills’ text and 
operation demonstrate that they are not neutral.202 However, the 
courts have repeatedly held that freedom of religion does not 
require the judiciary to void secular laws that may incidentally 
conflict with religious doctrine.203 The Court has stressed that even 
if a law creates a substantial burden on free exercise rights, it will 
still be upheld if the law is justified by broad public interest.204 It is 
against this backdrop that the next section will readdress and 
reinforce the argument that there is a compelling need for 
legislation. 
C. The Compelling Need to Address the Rising Influence of 
Foreign and Sharia Law 
Many compelling reasons support any legislative measures that 
combat the growing significance of Sharia Law. First, there is 
undoubtedly an interest in reinforcing the supremacy of state and 
federal law. Second, there is an interest in ensuring due process 
and other constitutional protections. As one commentator notes, 
“[T]he child custody cases in Maryland and Louisiana involved 
issues of gender discrimination, denial of freedom of travel, 
disregard for the best interests of a child, lack of procedural due 
process, and cruel and unusual punishment.”205 Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, preemptive and proactive measures should be 
taken to safeguard against Sharia Law’s rising influence.206 One 
expert report on the growth of Sharia in the United States contends 
that “shariah [sic] is wholly at odds with U.S. national sovereignty, 
the U.S. Constitution, and the liberties it guarantees.”207  
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A highly persuasive argument exists for taking preemptive and 
proactive measures to combat any chance of allowing a parallel 
legal system to take root in the United States, and the bills that 
address Sharia Law are a move in the right direction. A parallel 
Sharia Law system has proven to be particularly problematic in 
Britain. For example, one commentator notes that the use of Sharia 
councils in Britain has created a course where the country is 
“inadvertently sanctioning a parallel legal system which no longer 
embodies the values of British law regarding equal judicial 
treatment of men and women.”208 The report by the French 
intellectual think tank, L’Institut Montaigne, echoes these same 
concerns in France.209 The French report shows that Muslim 
leaders are spearheading efforts to promote social marginalization 
to create a parallel Islamic society controlled by Sharia Law.210 In 
support of the proposed ALAC bill in Michigan, the AILC stated: 
“The contrast between what has occurred in Britain and in Canada 
provides a roadmap for how the U.S. may address these legal 
issues.”211 
In a similar vein, the Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) warns 
that “the erection of a ‘parallel Shariah’ could also open a space 
for the introduction of radical Shariah principles, since, in a 
Muslim-only legal structure, Muslim representatives of varying 
orientations could gain authority.”212 The CIP study also found that 
the introduction of a parallel Sharia system threatens to restrict 
existing religious liberties rather than increase them.213 The report 
warns that even a minimal “parallel Shariah” could be widely 
abused because it could come under the control of radicals who 
would exploit it to impose their own agenda.214 A group that 
campaigns against the use of Sharia Law in Britain echoes this 
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warning.215 This group warns that the existence of a parallel legal 
system “discriminates and sets up different and separate systems, 
standards and norms for ‘different’ people. It reinforces the 
fragmentation of society, and leaves large numbers of people, 
particularly women and children, at the mercy of elders and 
imams.”216 The group notes that the British system has led to a 
situation that “increases marginalisation and the further 
segregation of immigrant communities. It ensures that immigrants 
and new arrivals remain forever minorities and never equal 
citizens.”217  
CONCLUSION 
The overarching argument in favor of combating the rising 
influence of Sharia Law and foreign law is quite simple: 
Americans have a fundamental interest in deciding what laws 
should govern in the courts and especially in prohibiting laws that 
conflict with existing American law. The case law clearly shows 
that existing law and judicial procedures have proven woefully 
inadequate in dealing with the growing problem of foreign law in 
American courts. Foreign legal doctrines should not be used as a 
Ho Chi Minh Trail around the Constitution.218 Although some 
Sharia-specific bills are poorly worded, the legislation designed to 
inhibit or prohibit foreign legal doctrines antithetical to American 
constitutional protections are hardly xenophobic or futile measures.  
The few bills specifically mentioning Sharia Law that state 
legislatures have either passed or considered have a greater 
likelihood of being struck down as violative of the First 
Amendment. For this reason, state legislators should pursue the 
ALAC bills. It is imperative that American law be clear and 
unambiguous: decisions based on foreign law and doctrines should 
not be applied or enforced when inconsistent with American public 
policy and constitutional guarantees. A silver bullet may not exist, 
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but the solution to the foreign law problem is certainly not silence 
and inaction. The question of limiting or prohibiting foreign 
sources of law, especially Sharia Law, should be taken very 
seriously in light of the above considerations. As more Muslims 
and other religious minorities continue to immigrate to the United 
States and become citizens, the courts must be well-equipped to 
account for the use of foreign sources of law, especially claims 
rooted in Sharia Law. The challenge is to provide American courts 
with proper guidance while simultaneously balancing 
constitutional protections. At the end of the day, common sense 
and American history show that Americans have a right to require 
that courts do not consider foreign laws that conflict with 
American laws.  
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